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NOTE
CHOOSING BETWEEN THE NECESSITY AND PUBLIC
INTEREST STANDARDS IN FCC REVIEW OF
MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES
Peter DiCola*
Section 202(h) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as amended,
directs the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to review
its media ownership rules every four years. But the statute contains
an ambiguity regarding the standard of review that the FCC must ap-
ply during such proceedings. To retain a particular media ownership
regulation, must the FCC merely show that the regulation advances
one of the FCC's three public-interest goals for media: competition,
diversity, and localism-applying a "public interest" standard? Or
must the FCC meet the higher burden of demonstrating that the regu-
lation is also indispensable for maintaining competition, diversity, or
localism at some threshold level-applying a "necessity" standard?
The answer to this procedural question has important substantive
consequences for media policy. But, despite recent case law on the
issue, the controversy over the standard of review can recur with
each FCC media-ownership proceeding. Furthermore, neither can-
ons of construction nor legislative history settle the ambiguous
nature of section 202(h). But the analysis of previous appellate
courts, as well as several policy considerations like facilitating cost-
benefit analysis and ameliorating agency capture, suggest that the
FCC and the courts should apply a public-interest standard until
Congress acts to clarify section 202(h).
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INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act")' changed regula-
tion of media ownership in both substantive and procedural ways. The
substantive changes-relaxing national and local station ownership limits in
the radio industry as well as market share limits in the television industry2-
have received considerable study by commentators and increasing attention
from the public at large.4 In addition to the arguably substantial effects of
allowing larger radio and television companies,5 the procedural changes of
the Telecom Act have also had a significant impact. These lesser-known pro-
cedural changes have affected both the framing and the pace of the
regulatory debate. In particular, by requiring the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") to review its remaining media ownership rules on a
periodic basis, Congress ensured continuing controversy over media regula-
tion.
This Note shows that a significant part of the controversy centers on the
FCC's review procedure itself, rather than the substantive rules being re-
viewed. The specific provision establishing the FCC's review of its media
ownership rules gives the Commission ambiguous instructions. The source
of this ambiguity, section 202(h) of the Telecom Act, reads as follows:
(h) FURTHER COMMISSION REVIEW.-The Commission shall review its
rules adopted pursuant to this section and all of its ownership rules bienni-
ally as part of its regulatory reform review under section 11 of the
Communications Act of 1934 and shall determine whether any of such
rules are necessary in the public interest as the result of competition. The
I. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. The Act eliminated the National Radio Ownership Rule, Telecommunications Act of
1996 § 202(a), which had previously capped the number of commercial radio stations one company
could own at forty, with subcaps of twenty AM and twenty FM, Revision of Radio Rules and Poli-
cies, 57 Fed. Reg. 42,701 3 (Sept. 16, 1992). The Act loosened the Local Radio Ownership Rule
from a sliding scale of three to four stations, id. 6, to a sliding scale of five to eight stations per
local market, Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(b). Finally, the Act raised the market share
limit contained in the Local Television Ownership Rule from twenty-five percent, Multiple Owner-
ship of AM, FM and Television Broadcast Stations, 50 Fed. Reg. 4666 3 (Feb. 1, 1985), to thirty-
five percent, Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(c)(1 )(B).
3. See, e.g., ERIC KLINENBERG, FIGHTING FOR AIR: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL AMERICA'S
MEDIA (2007); ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, RICH MEDIA, POOR DEMOCRACY: COMMUNICATION POLI-
TICS IN DUBIous TIMES (1999); C. Edwin Baker, Media Concentration: Giving up on Democracy,
54 FLA. L. REV. 839 (2002).
4. See Press Release, The Pew Research Ctr. for The People & The Press, Public Wants
Neutrality and Pro-American Point of View: Strong Opposition to Media Cross-Ownership Emerges
(July 13, 2003), http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/ 88.pdf.
5. See, e.g., PETER DICOLA, FALSE PREMISES, FALSE PROMISES: A QUANTITATIVE HISTORY
OF OWNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION IN THE RADIO INDUSTRY (2006), http://www.futureofmusic.org/
images/FMCradiostudy06.pdf (criticizing the easing of restrictions on radio station ownership).
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Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to be no
longer in the public interest.
6
The provision has three important aspects: (1) it established biennial re-
view of media ownership rules, which Congress has since changed to a
quadrennial review;7 (2) it placed the burden of proof on the FCC to defend
any media ownership rule it seeks to retain; and (3) it set a standard of re-
view that the FCC must meet to satisfy that burden of proof. Changes (1)
and (2) are clear, but change (3) remains murky. The language of the first
and second sentences of section 202(h) differs-"necessary in the public
interest" versus "no longer in the public interest"-leaving the standard of
review ambiguous.
This Note argues for a "public interest" interpretation of section 202(h)
as opposed to a "necessity" interpretation. Part I explains the dispute be-
tween these two readings of section 202(h) and why the controversy will
recur with each quadrennial review despite a recent Third Circuit case ad-
dressing the issue. Part II demonstrates that the language of section 202(h) is
ambiguous, based on canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history,
and two D.C. Circuit cases that first analyzed the provision. Part III uses
recent judicial precedent, comparative analysis, historical legislative context,
and other policy considerations to argue that the FCC and the courts should
adopt a public interest interpretation of section 202(h) until Congress acts to
resolve the provision's ambiguity.
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE FCC's MEDIA OWNERSHIP
RULES REMAINS CONTROVERSIAL
This Part explains the nature of the controversy between the two inter-
pretations of section 202(h). The standard of review in the FCC's
quadrennial reviews of its media ownership rules will shape more than
commission procedure. It also has important implications for how many
media ownership rules the FCC can justify and retain. In 2004, the Third
Circuit adopted the public interest interpretation of section 202(h)8 but, as
this Part shows, the court's decision did not settle the issue. Section L.A il-
lustrates how the public interest and necessity interpretations differ. Section
I.B shows that the controversy over section 202(h) will continue because
different circuit courts could have jurisdiction over future reviews and be-
cause courts could defer to the FCC if it changes its interpretation. Section
I.C discusses failed legislative attempts to eliminate the ambiguity in section
202(h) and end the regularly occurring controversy.
6. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h). Section 11 of the Communications Act of
1934 was actually a 1996 amendment to that statute, also contained in the Telecom Act. § 402(a). It
set up a periodic review of FCC regulations on telecommunications service providers (e.g., tele-
phone companies). Id.; see also Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 357 E3d 88, 91-92 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
7. Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-199, § 629(3), 118 Stat. 3, 100.
8. Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 382 (3rd Cir. 2004).
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A. The Public Interest Interpretation and the
Necessity Interpretation Differ
The controversy over section 202(h) stems from a conflict between the
language of its first and second sentences. Regulated media companies
claim that thefirst sentence of section 202(h) establishes the phrase "neces-
sary in the public interest" as the standard of review.9 The "necessity"
interpretation understands "necessary" in the sense of "indispensable," set-
ting a high bar for retaining existing regulations. '0 The FCC and media-
watchdog groups, however, have usually advocated a lower standard, based
on the wording of the second sentence of section 202(h)." Since Congress
directed the FCC to eliminate those rules that are "'no longer in the public
interest[,]'" this argument goes, only the words "in the public interest" set
the standard of proof. 2 Under the "public interest" interpretation, the ap-
pearance of the word "necessary" in the first sentence of section 202(h)
means "'useful,' 'convenient' or 'appropriate' rather than 'required' or 'in-
dispensable.' ,13
The public interest interpretation and the necessity interpretation suggest
very different inquiries and would lead to different substantive media poli-
cies. Applying a public interest standard requires the FCC to ask whether a
particular regulation furthers one of the FCC's three central policy goals for
media: competition, diversity, and localism. 4 If so, then the FCC may retain
the regulation. The necessity standard, on the other hand, involves a heavier
burden of justification. To demonstrate that a regulation meets the necessity
standard, the FCC must do more than show that a regulation has a positive
effect toward one of the Commission's three policy goals. The FCC must
also show that, without the regulation, the level of competition, diversity, or
localism would drop below an acceptable threshold-the point at which
market forces in the media industries, in the absence of regulation, result in
anti-competitive mergers or produce programming with too little diversity
9. See Fox Television Stations v. FCC (Fox II), 293 F.3d 537, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (refer-
ring to the television networks' assertion that "'necessary in the public interest' means more than 'in
the public interest' ").
10. See Stuart A. Shorenstein & Loma Veraldi, Defining the Public Interest in Terms of
Regulatory Necessity, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 45, 46-47 (2003) (discussing "necessity"
and "public interest" as different standards).
11. See Brief for Respondents at 23-28, Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372 (3d
Cir. 2004) (Nos. 03-3388, 03-3577, 03-3578, 03-3579, 03-3580, 03-3581, 03-3582, 03-3651, 03-
3665, 03-3675, 03-3708, 03-3894, 03-3950, 03-3951, & 03-4073), available at http://www.
mediaaccess.org/programs/diversity/FCCRespondentBrief.pdf.
12. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 391.
13. Id.
14. PHILIP M. NAPOLI, FOUNDATIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS POLICY: PRINCIPLES AND PROC-
ESS IN THE REGULATION OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA 64 (2001). For an explanation and analysis of what
competition, diversity, and localism mean in broadcast regulation, see id. at 125-74, 203-24.
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and localism. 5 Requiring this additional evidence means that the necessity
standard sets a higher bar for regulations. As a result, the necessity standard
would probably lead the FCC to eliminate most, if not all, of its media own-
ership rules. 
6
B. Periodic Review, Randomly Selected Appellate Jurisdiction, and
Judicial Deference Will Generate Continual Controversy
Despite a recent Third Circuit ruling on the meaning of section 202(h),
the process of quadrennial review, in combination with jurisdictional rules
and administrative-law principles, will foster continual controversy over the
provision's standard of review. In Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, the
Third Circuit chose the public interest interpretation, writing:
In a periodic review under § 202(h), the Commission is required to deter-
mine whether its then-extant rules remain useful in the public interest; if
no longer useful, they must be repealed or modified. Yet no matter what
the Commission decides to do to any particular rule-retain, repeal, or
modify (whether to make more or less stringent)-it must do so in the pub-
lic interest and support its decision with a reasoned analysis. 7
The Third Circuit declined to read section 202(h) as embodying a pre-
sumption against retaining media ownership rules, rejecting the necessity
interpretation." But Prometheus does not settle the question of how to inter-
pret section 202(h).
After future quadrennial reviews, a judicial panel will select the appel-
late court randomly if parties appeal in multiple circuits. This procedure
allows for the possibility that a different appellate court will adopt a differ-
ent interpretation than the Third Circuit and bind the FCC to an alternative
standard under section 202(h). The FCC will necessarily revisit section
202(h) in each quadrennial review because the provision requires the FCC to
conduct the proceeding and interpret the standard of review. This procedure
provides the parties on each side of the media ownership debate-regulated
media companies and public interest groups-a guaranteed opportunity to
challenge the FCC's statutory interpretation. As long as they file timely ap-
peals in multiple circuit courts, the case could end up in any circuit court due
to the random selection process used by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
15. See Fox Television Stations, Inc., v. FCC (Fox 1), 280 F.3d 1027, 1042 (D.C. Cir.) (apply-
ing a necessity standard and assessing whether one of the FCC's rules was necessary to "safeguard"
competition and diversity), modified on reh 'g, 293 F3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
16. See Rachel M. Stilwell, Which Public? Whose Interest? How the FCC's Deregulation of
Radio Station Ownership Has Harmed the Public Interest, and How We Can Escape from the
Swamp, 26 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 369, 371 (2006) (discussing judicial opinions opting for the
necessity interpretation as "presumptively deregulatory").
17. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 395 (footnote omitted).
18. For a detailed analysis of the Prometheus court's reasoning and the key precedent cited,
see infra Section III.A.
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Litigation." Since the FCC's media ownership rules apply nationwide, any
circuit court (except the Federal Circuit) could have jurisdiction. A different
circuit court could come to a different conclusion than the Third Circuit and
force the FCC to follow their ruling as the most recent appellate ruling on
the issue. Although the regulated media companies advocating the necessity
interpretation lost at the appellate level in Prometheus, and although the
Supreme Court denied certiorari,2 ° they will still have multiple and continu-
ing opportunities to challenge the Third Circuit's interpretation of section
202(h).
Principles of administrative law also suggest that the controversy will
continue. If the FCC reversed its previous position on section 202(h), a re-
viewing court may well defer to the FCC's new interpretation under step
two of the Chevron doctrine, as long as the court found under step one that
the language of section 202(h) was ambiguous.' Under Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,2 2 the
FCC would still have to survive "arbitrary and capricious" review, which
some commentators have described as "step three" of Chevron.23 But at that
stage, the FCC could receive additional deference because its interpretation
24reflects the policy of a newly elected administration . In theory, each suc-
cessive quadrennial review could occur under a different president. If either
regulated media companies or media watchdog groups could convince the
FCC under a new administration to change its stance, then a reviewing court
might well defer to the FCC's new interpretation, even if such deference
would reverse that particular circuit's previous decisions. This agency-based
dynamic would also render the section 202(h) controversy perpetual, short
of congressional action.
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) (2000); Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 388-89 ("Under 28 U.S.C. §
2112(a), petitions to review administrative orders filed in different circuit courts within the first ten
days of the appeal period trigger a lottery conducted by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litiga-
tion.").
20. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 545 U.S. 1123 (2005), denying cert. to, 373 F.3d 372
(3d Cir. 2004).
21. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (insti-
tuting a two-step process for reviewing courts: first, determining whether a statute is ambiguous and,
second, if the statute is ambiguous, determining whether the administrative agency's interpretation
is reasonable).
22. 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (overturning the National Transportation Highway Safety Admini-
stration's revocation of its own previously promulgated seatbelt and airbag regulation as
insufficiently justified).
23. See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY:
PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 433-34 (5th ed. 2002).
24. "A change in administration brought about by the people casting their votes is a perfectly
reasonable basis for an executive agency's reappraisal of the costs and benefits of its programs and
regulations." State Farm, 463 U.S. at 59 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The FCC's 2006 quadrennial review25 indicates that interested parties do
not consider the issue settled and suggests that they will seek to take advan-
tage of these jurisdictional and administrative-law mechanisms. In its initial
notice of proposed rulemaking, the Commission does no more than quote
the statutory language and cite the relevant opinions; it does not offer an
interpretation of section 202(h). 26 But the mere fact that the proceeding oc-
curs under the authority of section 202(h) has led several parties filing
comments to argue for a "deregulatory" slant to the FCC's standard of re-
view.27 Clear Channel Communications goes so far as to urge the FCC to
change its interpretation from a public interest standard to the higher neces-
sity standard. 28 Applying the whole act rule, 29 dictionary definitions for the
term "necessary, and the rule against surplusage,3 Clear Channel has ex-
plicitly urged the FCC to defy the Third Circuit's interpretation in
Prometheus. In the future, parties on either side of the media ownership de-
bate will have periodic opportunities to argue for their preferred
interpretation of section 202(h).
C. Congress has not Adopted a Legislative Solution
Legislation that would resolve the controversy over section 202(h) has
not succeeded in Congress. Because of random appellate-court selection and
judicial deference to changing agency interpretations, only legislation will
avoid the continuing controversy. Two bills discussed by the Senate Com-
merce Committee in 2003 would have resolved the ambiguity in section
202(h). The committee held several hearings about media consolidation
25. The FCC launched the proceeding on June 21, 2006 and has not completed its review as
of this writing. 2006 Quadrennial Regulatory Review; 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review
of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 45,511 (Aug. 9, 2006) (to be codi-
fied at 47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., Comments of the National Ass'n of Broadcasters at 4-5, Review of the
Comm'n's Broad. Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Tele-
comm. Act, FCC MB Docket Nos. 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, & 00-244 (Oct. 23, 2006).
28. Comments of Clear Channel Communications, Inc. at 5-6, Review of the Comm'n's
Broad. Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomm. Act,
FCC MB Docket Nos. 06-121, 02-277, 01-235, 01-317, & 00-244 (Oct. 23, 2006) [hereinafter
Comments of Clear Channel Communications].
29. See infra text accompanying notes 53-55.
30. See Comments of Clear Channel Communications, supra note 28, at 5 (citing WEBSTER'S
THIRD INTERNAT'L DICTIONARY 1511 (1976) and OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2001)).
31. Clear Channel's surplusage argument is that the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")
already requires any agency to continually justify its rules in light of changing conditions. If one
interprets Section 202(h) to do no more than that, the argument goes, then it has been rendered
superfluous, calling the entire interpretation into question. Id. at 6. The argument blurs the distinc-
tion between a vague notion of continual justification under the APA and the very specific provision
represented by section 202(h)'s quadrennial review.
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even before the FCC Order of June 2, 2003.32 The FCC's standard of review
remained contentious in both houses of Congress in 2004. . Neither of the
two bills was passed by the full Senate and neither received support from
House leadership.3 4 The conference committee removed the proposed clari-
fying language for section 202(h) even as Congress adopted the shift from a
biennial to a quadrennial review.
The first of these bills, the Preservation of Localism, Program Diversity,
and Competition in Television Broadcast Service Act of 2003, would have
resolved the ambiguity of section 202(h) by amending it in two ways. 3 First,
it eliminated the word "necessary," so the FCC would justify rules by a sim-
ple "in the public interest" standard. 6 Second, the bill listed four actions
available to the FCC: (a) strengthening or broadening a rule; (b) limiting or
narrowing a rule; (c) eliminating a rule; and (d) retaining a rule.37 A second
bill, the FCC Reauthorization Act of 2003, had language changing the
FCC's biennial review into a quadrennial review.38 It would also have clari-
fied Congress's intent with respect to Section 202(h) in exactly the same
way as the Preservation of Localism, Program Diversity, and Competition in
Television Broadcast Service Act.39 The bills' failure leaves the statutorylanguage ambiguous.
II. SECTION 202(H) OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF 1996 IS AMBIGUOUS
This Part argues that Section 202(h) is inherently ambiguous and does
not clearly set the standard of review that the FCC should apply in the quad-
rennial reviews of its media ownership rules. It examines the problems
presented by the wording and context of section 202(h). Lpoking to tradi-
tional guides of statutory interpretation, Section II.A applies canons of
construction, while Section II.B explores the legislative history of Section
32. E.g., Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. of Commerce, Sci., & Trans., Ownership in
Radio Industry Hearing Set for January 30 (January 24, 2003), http://commerce.senate.gov/
-commerce/press/03/2003124A29.html (last visited May 17, 2007).
33. That the committee even sought to clarify section 202(h) reinforces the claim, made in
Part II, that section 202(h) is ambiguous.
34. See Congressional Update, Free Press Congressional Update: Congressional Session
Winds Dows-Where Do We Stand?, FREE PRESS, Oct. 31, 2003, http://www.freepress.net/
congress/update.php?id=26 (last visited May 17, 2007).
35. S. 1046, 108th Cong. § 5 (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:s.01046: (last visited May 17, 2007). The bill narrowly passed in the Senate
Commerce Committee but did not pass in the full Senate.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. S. 1264, 108th Cong. §4 (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:s.01264: (last visited May 17, 2007). In the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
Congress enacted this proposal, altering Section 202(h) from a biennial review to a quadrennial




202(h). Section II.C surveys two cases in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
that illustrate the difficulty of the interpretive problem in practice.
A. Canons of Construction Cannot Resolve the Ambiguity
Courts and the FCC have, with good reason, had difficulty making sense
of Congress's directive in Section 202(h) of the Telecom Act. Three canons
of statutory interpretation-plain meaning, expressio unius, and the whole
act rule-have particular relevance to the language of section 202(h). While
many judges and commentators have inveighed against application of ex-
pressio unius and the whole act rule,4' expressio unius can be a helpful
canon of construction in some contexts,42 and many regulated parties have
argued for applying the whole act rule to section 202(h). 43 Because the plain
meaning leads to impractical results and because the other two canons con-
flict, this section concludes that canons of statutory interpretation alone are
insufficient to resolve the ambiguity.
1. Plain Meaning
The plain meaning of section 202(h) involves a conflict between the pro-
vision's first and second sentences. The FCC must repeal media-ownership
rules failing to meet a certain standard-but it's difficult to tell what stan-
dard. The choice of the verb "shall" in the first sentence of section 202(h)
indicates that the FCC must engage in a quadrennial review and must make
a determination about each rule. 4 That much is clear. But the second sen-
tence's failure to repeat the same language as the first sentence implies that
the statute expresses two different standards. On its face, section 202(h)
40. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 405 (1950) (arguing that
for every canon of construction, there is an opposing canon).
41. Judge Richard Posner points out that an ambiguous portion of a statute could be a legis-
lative accident; it may be a mistake to assume that a legislature has considered every implication of
its language. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 281 (1985), quoted
in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF
PUBLIC POLICY 651 (2d ed. 1995).
42. See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 136 (1989) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring), noted in ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 41, at 639.
43. See, e.g., Comments of Clear Channel Communications, supra note 28, at 2-6.
44. The may/shall canon of construction holds that "shall" implies a limit on discretion. The
notion of limiting discretion might be interpreted broadly to inform the whole purpose of the statute.
But in ordinary usage, may and shall can be interchangeable, so this canon of construction (like all
canons) is highly disputable. ESKRIDGE & FIOCKEY, supra note 41, at 642.
45. The rule against surplusage indicates that the word "necessary" must mean something.
See ESKRDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 41, at 644. On the other hand, the term may simply refer to
the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" standard, borrowed by communications law from
public utility law. In that case, the term "necessary" would merely be an allusion to a standard that
has simply come to mean "public interest." See Shorenstein & Veraldi, supra note 10, at 45 & n.2,
46 (opining that "'convenience and necessity' had merely tagged along with 'public interest"' when
applied to "broadcast" in the Communications Act of 1934); cf. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 59 (2001) (describing the "sloppy, last-minute scramble"
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instructs the FCC to determine which rules are "necessary in the public in-
terest" but eliminate the rules that are "no longer in the public interest.
4 6
The provision does not explicitly instruct the FCC to eliminate the rules that
are no longer "necessary." The standard of proof changes from the first sen-
tence to the second. Applied literally, the language of section 202(h)
indicates that the FCC should: (1) generate a list of rules failing to be "nec-
essary" but then (2) eliminate only the subset of those rules not in the public
interest at all. This two-step process is the plain meaning of section 202(h).
Although the plain meaning of section 202(h) is not contradictory, it
could lead to wasteful applications. The second step would render the de-
termination of necessity in the first step functionally separate from the
review process in the second step. Such an exercise would waste scarce
agency resources. On the other hand, one might find this interpretation plau-
sible; section 202(h) could be specifying an initial "fact-finding" mission
with one criterion and a subsequent review step with an eye towards a less
stringent criterion. 4' But courts have rejected an analogous two-step process
as impractical and wasteful.48
2. Expressio Unius
The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("inclusion of one
thing indicates exclusion of the other ' 49) supports the public interest inter-
pretation. Expressio unius can be used to contrast language choices in
separate statutory provisions. The language of section 202(h) contrasts with
the language of a different biennial review provision in the Telecom Act that
applied to the telecommunications industry rather than the broadcasting in-
dustry. Section 402(a) of the Telecom Act added section 11 to the
Communications Act of 1934, providing:
(a) Biennial review of regulations
In every even-numbered year (beginning with 1998), the Commis-
sion-
(1) shall review all regulations issued under this chapter in effect at the
time of the review that apply to the operations or activities of any
provider of telecommunications service; and
in shifting from "public convenience, interest, or necessity" to "public interest, convenience, and
necessity" in the Communications Act of 1934). The conflict between the rule against surplusage
and this possible historical allusion only bolsters the claim that the statutory language of Section
202(h) is ambiguous.
46. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 65, 111-12.
47. Daniel Loeffler suggested this argument. The "fact-finding" step would involve deter-
mining which media ownership rules are necessary, storing that information, and providing a
catalogue of research findings with which the FCC Commissioners could conduct their review. The
review step, then, would involve eliminating rules that did not serve the public interest.
48. See, e.g., Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 357 F.3d 88, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (calling a similar two-
step process of the FCC adopting rules that are "in the public interest" but then eliminating those
rules that fail to meet the higher bar of being "necessary in the public interest" as "absurd").
49. ESKRIOGE & FRICKEY, supra note 41, at 638-39.
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(2) shall determine whether any such regulation is no longer necessary
in the public interest as the result of meaningful economic compe-
tition between providers of such service.
(b) Effect of determination
The Commission shall repeal or modify any regulation it determines to
be no longer necessary in the public interest.
50
In section 402(a), Congress used very strict parallelism, in contrast to
the first sentence-second sentence variation in Section 202(h). The determi-
nation with respect to regulations of telecommunications services is phrased
negatively ("no longer necessary"),5' whereas section 202(h) phrases the
standard positively ("determine whether any of such rules are necessary").52
Applying expressio unius involves comparing sections 202(h) and
402(a). Congress eschewed parallelism and included the "no longer neces-
sary" language in the second sentence of section 402(a), whereas it did not
include such language in the second sentence of section 202(h). For this
reason, section 402(a) appears to contain a higher standard of review than
section 202(h). This suggests that Congress intended the FCC to conduct its
periodic review of broadcast media ownership rules according to the lower,
public interest standard. Another prominent canon, however, counsels oth-
erwise.
3. Whole Act Rule
The whole act rule prescribes interpreting each section of a statute in the
context of the whole enactment, 3 an approach that, in the case of section
202(h), supports the necessity interpretation. Parsing the language of section
202(h) suggests that it contains a lower standard, but an analysis of the Tele-
com Act's overall policy thrust suggests the reverse. The Telecom Act
eliminated many regulations, made others less restrictive, and put review
provisions in place that, at the very least, required a debate on the remaining
restrictions on media ownership every two (now four) years. 4 This deregula-
tory context implies that Congress intended to create a necessity standard in
section 202(h) of the Telecom Act, because a higher standard of review
55would lead the FCC to eliminate more rules in its periodic reviews.
Applying the whole act rule to section 202(h) produces the opposite re-
sult of expressio unius analysis. Together, the canons imply that section
202(h) is ambiguous, because applying expressio unius and applying the
50. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 402(a). 47 U.S.C. § 161 (2000) (emphases added).
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111-12.
53. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 41, at 643.
54. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 280 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir.) (explaining
Congress's deregulatory purpose in enacting the Telecomm Act), modified on reh'g, 293 F.3d 537
(D.C. Cir. 2002).
55. For a discussion of the hostility to regulation among some members of Congress, espe-
cially in the House of Representatives, see infra text accompanying notes 66-67 and Section n.B.2.
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whole act rule produce equally sensible but conflicting results. Thus, the
principles of statutory interpretation most relevant to section 202(h) conflict
and do not clarify which standard of review the provision contains.
B. The Legislative History Does not Provide Conclusive Guidance
Legislative reports56 offer a way to investigate how Congress understood
the language of section 202(h) in February 1996. Both "public interest" and
"necessity" hark back to the historical Communications Act of 1934 stan-
dard (borrowed from public utility law), "public interest, convenience, and
necessity.'5 7 Historically, however, the FCC and Congress have emphasized
the term "public interest" in their statutory and regulatory phrasing rather
than "necessity.'58 The legislative reports might resolve this tension in Con-
gress's policy directive to the FCC and explain Congress's decision to
employ differing language in its biennial review provisions, section 202(h)
and section 402(a).
This Section analyzes the legislative history of section 202(h) the Tele-
com Act in the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the Conference
Committee in turn. While some commentators and judges have criticized
judicial use of legislative history, 9 it remains a very common tool in statu-
tory construction." Unfortunately, the legislative reports suggest that the two
houses of Congress did not agree on an interpretation of section 202(h) and
failed to reach an unambiguous compromise.
1. Senate Legislative History Indicates a Moderate View
The Senate used relatively moderate language in discussing the proposed
periodic review provision of the Telecom Act. In a September 14, 1994 report,
the Senate Commerce Committee discussed its goals in requiring continued
FCC review of its media regulations.6 ' The report states that the FCC will
choose whether to "modify or remove its national and local ownership rules
56. This Note will focus on Senate and House reports more than floor speeches because the
floor speeches focused on broad policy goals rather than the provision-by-provision discussion of
reports.
57. BENJAMIN ET AL., supra note 45, at 17, 59.
58. Shorenstein & Veraldi, supra note 10, at 45-46 ("Over the years most interpretations
have focused on 'public interest,' to the exclusion of 'convenience' or 'necessity.' "); cf Howard A.
Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect the Public
Interest?, 94 CAL. L. REV. 371, 383 (2006) ("Given that each side of the debate over regulating
media ownership invokes the 'public interest' as supporting its position, it is not surprising that the
opposing sides have developed two distinct definitions of that concept.").
59. E.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 726 (1995)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning whether legislative history is "a legitimate and reliable tool of in-
terpretation" and offering an interpretation of the legislative history contrary to that of the majority).
60. E.g., id. at 704 (majority opinion) ("Our conclusion that the Secretary's definition of
'harm' rests on a permissible construction of the ESA gains further support from the legislative
history of the statute.").
61. S. REP. No. 103-367, at 98-99 (1994) (discussing what was then section 701, "Review of
broadcast rules," in the early Senate version of the Telecom Act).
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for radio and television broadcasters, ' notably declining to employ such
verbs as "retain" or "strengthen." The Commerce Committee characterized the
media ownership rules as dated and worried about incumbent broadcasters'
ability to compete with new, less regulated media companies:
Broadcasters and television networks should not continue to be subject to
regulations which are outmoded or simply inappropriate to the new com-
petitive environment which this legislation is attempting to facilitate. At
the same time, the Committee has concerns about the diversity of pro-
gramming and need for locally oriented programs. Accordingly, the
Committee intends that the FCC review carefully and comprehensively
these various regulations and make such changes as are consistent with the
public interest.
61
This language puts a more neutral spin on the "modify or remove" lan-
guage earlier in the report. The Commerce Committee concluded that the
FCC would make "such changes" to the media ownership rules-a neutral
phrase that could encompass repeal, modification, or strengthening of rules.
Furthermore, the Commerce Committee's intention that the FCC take ac-
tions "consistent" with the public interest conveys no deregulatory bias or
requirement of logical or empirical necessity. Under this language, the FCC
would conduct serious research into the rules, but would also have flexibil-
ity to continue to foster the goals of diversity and localism with regulation.
Although the legislative history reveals the moderate position of the ma-
jority in the Senate, a few senators articulated the minority position in favor
of deregulation. The senators' decision to express this view, however, simply
reinforces how moderate the majority position was. The later Senate Com-
merce Committee report, dated March 30th, 1995, uses very neutral
language, further supporting the idea that the Senate envisioned a public
interest standard. That report says, "The FCC is also required to review its
ownership rules biennially, as part of its overall regulatory review required
by new section 259 of the 1934 Act."64 In his additional commentary, Ernest
"Fritz" Hollings (D-SC) does not discuss instituting any slant toward de-
regulation in the FCC's periodic review. The minority view in the Senate,
articulated in the report by Conrad Bums (R-MT), Robert Packwood (R-
OR), and John McCain (R-AZ), was that the Senate bill, as of 1995, did not
go far enough towards deregulation. Their view advocated "total deregula-
tion" for radio66 and a "guaranteed end to regulation. 67
62. Id. at 98.
63. Id. at 99.
64. S. REP. No. 104-23, at 42 (1995) (discussing what was then Section 207(b) of the 1995
Senate version of the Telecom Act).
65. Id. at 69 (Additional Views of Senator Hollings) ("[The] FCC is instructed to review
these rules every two years.").
66. Id. at 65 (Additional Views of Senator Bums).
67. Id. at 71 (Minority Views of Senators Packwood and McCain). It is not clear that the
senators meant to refer to broadcast as well as telecommunications in their comments; their com-
ments mostly concerned telecommunications.
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Some have suggested that the biennial review provision represents a
concession won by the dissenters in the Senate. For example, one account
claims that Republican senators actually expected the FCC to fail to meet its
burden of research in the biennial review, leading to more deregulation.6
But the public record does not provide any evidence to support this account.
The Senate did not explicitly agree on a procedure with a substantive slant
toward eliminating rules as a substitute for repealing the media ownership
rules outright. Both the early and late Commerce Comunittee reports indi-
cate that the Senate version of the biennial review represented a
substantively neutral procedural provision that would allow the FCC to con-
tinue to consider the goals of diversity and localism.
2. House Legislative History Shows a Deregulatory Slant
In contrast to the Senate's moderate approach, the early House version
of the Telecom Act sought to deregulate media fully, indicating support for
the necessity interpretation of section 202(h). The midterm elections of 1994
motivated the House's deregulatory zeal. 69 The July 24, 1995, House Com-
merce Committee report on the Communications Act declared: "In a
competitive environment, arbitrary limitations on broadcast ownership and
blanket prohibitions on mergers or joint ventures between distribution out-
lets are no longer necessary.' 70 Section 302 ("Broadcast Ownership") of the
draft House bill would have eliminated all FCC restrictions on broadcast
ownership except the national television market share cap, relaxing the re-
striction from twenty-five percent to fifty percent within a year after
passage.7' The House sought to eliminate the national and local radio owner-
ship rules, the cable-broadcast ownership rules, and newspaper-broadcast
cross-ownership rules, which would have left only the national television
market share cap in place for biennial review by the FCC.
Because of its desire to eliminate most media ownership rules entirely,
the House did not provide details regarding the review provision. The
House's draft bill includes only a one-time review of the rules, rather than a
biennial review: "Within 3 years after such date of enactment, the Commis-
sion shall conduct a study on the operation of this paragraph and submit a
report to the Congress on the development of competition in the television
marketplace and the need for any revisions to or elimination of this para-
graph., 72 Its sole, narrow review provision for the national television market
share cap did not employ the "necessary in the public interest" language,
though it did use the word "need." Speculating about the House's intent,
68. See Alicia Mundy, Put the Blame on Peggy, Boys, CABLE WORLD, June 30, 2003, at 26-
27; see also infra text accompanying note 175.
69. PATRICIA AUFDERHEIDE, COMMUNICATIONS POLICY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 53-55 (1999).
70. H.R. REP. No. 104-204, pt. 1, at 55 (1995).
71. Id. at 220.
72. Id. at 41.
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however, one can say with some assurance that the House-if it could not
achieve total deregulation-would have preferred stringent review of media
ownership rules with a deregulatory slant.
3. The Conference Report does not Clarify which View Prevailed
Unfortunately, the conference report from January 31, 199673 essentially
recites the ambiguous statutory language of section 202(h), providing no
additional clarification of the standard to be employed in the FCC's biennial
review. After noting the gap between the Senate's inclusion of a biennial
review provision and the House's approach of outright deregulation with a
single FCC study to follow, the conference report states:
Subsection (h) directs the Commission to review its rules adopted under
section 202 and all of its ownership rules biennially. In its review, the
Commission shall determine whcther any of its ownership rules, including
those adopted pursuant to this section, are necessary in the public interest
as the result of competition. Based on its findings in such a review, the
Commission is directed to repeal or modify any regulation it determines is
no longer in the public interest.74
The discussion merely mimics the bill itself, providing little interpretive
assistance. It does not make clear whether the Senate's or the House's vision
won out; this uncertainty leaves the interpretation of section 202(h) ambigu-
ous.
Some aspects of the legislative history suggest that the final, enacted
form of section 202(h) reflects the Senate's moderate position. Many media
ownership rules survived the congressional conference on the Telecom Act,
as did the Senate's idea of biennial review, while the House's notion of a
single FCC study within three years vanished." The conference committee
may have adopted the neutral Senate version of broadcast regulation as part
of an exchange for accepting the House's version of various provisions re-
garding the cable and telecommunications industries. Patricia Aufderheide,
in her history of the Telecom Act, indicates that the conference negotiations
largely focused on the bill's treatment of the incumbent telephone compa-
76nies. In her account, broadcasters became involved later in the legislative
process than the phone companies and did not receive all the deregulatory
provisions they had sought.77
Unfortunately, other aspects of the legislative history foreclose the deci-
sive conclusion that the Senate's moderate interpretation won the day.
Aufderheide's account also notes that broadcasters achieved relaxation of
73. The Telecom Act passed both houses of Congress on February 1, 1996 and President
Clinton signed the bill on February 8, 1996.
74. See H.R. REP. No. 104-458, at 161-64 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
75. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 202(h), 110 Stat. 56, 111 -
12 (requiring the FCC to review its media ownership rules "biennially").
76. AuFDERHEIDE, supra note 69, at 59-60.
77. Id. at 48-49, 60.
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many media ownership rules and a chance every two years to challenge the
regulations that remained.8 Moreover, the term "consistent" in the early
Senate version gave way to the term "necessary" as a modifier for "public
interest," suggesting that Congress wanted the FCC to scrutinize the media
ownership rules thoroughly.79 The language "repeal or modify" entered the
final bill, while no language appears about the goals of diversity and local-
ism. 8° Neither the Senate's nor the House's position on biennial review canguide interpretation of section 202(h) definitively.
C. The D.C. Circuit's Analysis Illustrates
the Ambiguity of Section 202(h)
In 2002, two cases in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with chal-• - 81
lenges to FCC decisions to retain certain media ownership rules in its 1998
biennial review." They were the only cases to address Section 202(h) di-
rectly until the Third Circuit decided Prometheus. Both cases hinged on the
standard of review in section 202(h) and highlight the ambiguity of section
202(h). Even for the brief period that the D.C. Circuit chose the necessity
interpretation over the public interest interpretation, judges in the circuit
who agreed on the necessity interpretation differed on exactly how high to
make the necessity standard.
1. Fox Television Stations
The D.C. Circuit, for a short time, opted for the necessity interpretation
of section 202(h). In Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC ("Fox I'), media
companies challenged the FCC's decision to retain two media ownership
rules-the Cable-Broadcast Cross-ownership rule (CBCO) and the National
81Television Station Ownership rule (NTSO)-in its 1998 biennial review.
The D.C. Circuit ordered the FCC to repeal the CBCO after concluding
there was no justification for the rule but remanded the NTSO to the FCC
for further consideration. 4 The court held that, to retain a media ownership
78. Id. at 67-69.
79. Compare Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h) (requiring the FCC to "determine
whether any of such rules are necessary in the public interest"), with S. REP. No. 103-367, at 99
(1994) (requiring the FCC to "review carefully and comprehensively these various regulations and
make such changes as are consistent with the public interest").
80. Compare Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h) ("The Commission shall repeal or
modify any regulation it determines to be no longer in the public interest."), with S. REP. No. 103-
367, at 99 ("[tlhe Committee has concerns about the diversity of programming and need for locally
oriented programs.")
81. See Sinclair Broad. Group, Inc. v. FCC, 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002); Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 1), 280 E3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh 'g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
82. 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, 15 EC.C.R. 11058, 11061 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n May 26,2000).
83. Fox 1, 280 F3d at 1033-34.
84. Id. at 1049, 1053.
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rule, the FCC must find that rule to be "necessary 'in the public interest.' ,,81
The court interpreted these words as establishing a necessity standard, rely-
ing heavily on its interpretation of the Telecom Act's-and section
86202(h)'s-general purpose. The court found that Congress, through section
202(h) of the Telecom Act, sought "to continue the process of deregula-
tion. 's Rather than the "incremental" approach urged by the FCC, the court
wrote that "the mandate of § 202(h) might better be likened to Farragut's
order at the battle of Mobile Bay ('Damn the torpedoes! Full speed
ahead.'). ' ' "8
On rehearing, s9 however, the court reversed itself and again left the stan-
dard ambiguous. The court abandoned its initial interpretation of section
202(h), finding it inessential to the holding in Fox I:
We agree with the Commission that the subject paragraph is itself not nec-
essary to the opinion and should be modified. The court's decision did not
turn at all upon interpreting "necessary in the public interest" to mean
more than "in the public interest": It was clear the Commission failed to
justify the NTSO and the CBCO Rules under either standard.... Thus, we
decline the Commission's and the intervenors' request that we interpret
"necessary" in their favor at this time, and we accept the Commission's al-
ternative invitation to modify the opinion in order to leave this question
90
open.
The original Fox I decision found that the FCC had defended the NTSO
with insufficient evidence and had defended the CBCO with no relevant
evidence at all. 9' Therefore, to remand the NTSO and vacate the CBCO the
court only had to hold that section 202(h) placed the burden of proof on the92
FCC. The standard of proof, however, was irrelevant to the outcome of Fox
L.
93 The court might have chosen to leave the question open on rehearing in
recognition of the important policy consequences of the standard of proof.
94
85. Id. at 1041 (quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202(h)).
86. Id. at 1042.
87. Id. at 1033.
88. Id. at 1044.
89. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC (Fox 11), 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
90. Id. at 540.
91. Fox I, 280 F.3d at 1041 (criticizing FCC for citing "a single, barely relevant study" to
support the NTSO); id. at 1053 ("[T]he [FCC) failed to respond to the objections put before it.").
92. In Fox 1, the court had observed that "SecC.3n 202(h) carries with it a presumption in
favor of repealing or modifying the ownership rules." Id. at 1048. It appears from the court's deci-
sion upon rehearing in Fox H that this presumption could be effected through changing the burden of
proof alone, without necessarily setting up the highest possible standard of proof.
93. See Fox H, 293 F.3d at 541 ("Even if 'necessary in the public interest' means simply
'continues to serve the public interest,' for the reasons given above and below, the Commission's
decision not to repeal or to modify the NTSO and the CBCO Rules cannot stand.").
94. The court in Fox II relied explicitly only on the parties in Fox I not having briefed the
issue. Id. at 540. But reopening a question on rehearing suggests that the court recognized that the
standard of review was a key policy issue, meriting a full briefing.
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2. Sinclair Broadcast Group
Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC95 demonstrates that section
202(h) can be ambiguous even after a circuit court has chosen one of the
two possible interpretations. In this case, the plaintiff challenged the Local
Television Ownership Rule (LTO) as arbitrary. The LTO allowed ownership
of two television stations in a single market only if one of the stations did
not rank in the top four in ratings and if eight independent owners of televi-
sion stations would exist in that market after the merger.96 Because the D.C.
Circuit decided the case during the four-month period between Fox I and
Fox 1,97 the court applied the higher necessity standard established in Fox
L98 The court's majority remanded parts of the LTO to the FCC but held that
parts of the LTO had been justified adequately. Despite the high standard of
proof, the Sinclair court did note the FCC's discretion to draw quantitative
lines and to exercise its judgment, informed by its expertise in the subject
area.99 The notion that the FCC has discretion stands in tension with the ne-
cessity interpretation, because that interpretation limits the agency's
discretion in favor of a deregulatory presumption.
Judge Sentelle concurred in part and dissented in part, with his dis-
agreement focusing on the contradiction between adopting the necessity
interpretation and leaving the FCC some discretion."' Judge Sentelle argued
that the FCC had not met its burden sufficiently to retain any of the LTO.'0 '
His concept of "necessity" differed greatly from the majority's, imposing
stricter limits on the FCC's discretion. Under his approach, the FCC itself
would specify these limits based on, first, more specific and concrete defini-
tions of its policy goals and, second, explanations of how media ownership
rules further those goals.'0 2 The majority only asked whether the FCC had
abused its discretion, 103 leaving the FCC with flexibility to define its policy
95. 284 F.3d 148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
96. Id. at 152.
97. The D.C. Circuit decided Sinclair on April 2, 2002. Id. at 148. The court had decided Fox
I on February 19, 2002. Fox 1, 280 F.3d at 1027. The court issued its opinion in Fox H on June 21,
2002. Fox H, 293 F.3d at 537.
98. Sinclair, 284 E3d at 159.
99. Id. at 162 ("[Tlhe Commission 'has wide discretion to determine where to draw adminis-
trative lines,' and, therefore, the court will reverse that choice only for abuse of discretion." (citing
AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607,627 (D.C. Cir. 2000))).
100. Id. at 171-72.
101. Id. at 170 (Sentelle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[H]ere there are no
meaningful limits to the diversity rationale offered by the Commission. There is no suggestion as to
how much diversity is enough, how much is too little, or how much is too much." (citation omit-
ted)).
102. Id. at 170 ("Even accepting for the moment that the FCC could regulate in the name of
diversity without further elucidating that goal, it must still, at a minimum, explain how its rule fur-
thers the goal of diversity.").
103. Id. at 162 (majority opinion) ("[T]he Commission 'has wide discretion to determine
where to draw administrative lines,' and, therefore, the court will reverse that choice only for abuse
of discretion." (citing AT&T Corp., 220 F3d at 627)).
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goals. In applying the necessity standard, the majority focused on the suffi-
ciency and logic of the FCC's explanation connecting the LTO to
diversity. '°4 In contrast, Judge Sentelle understood necessity to require a
higher level of specificity from the FCC to justify its rules.' 5 Thus, during
the brief time when the D.C. Circuit recognized the necessity standard as
law, exactly how much more demanding a necessity standard was remained
unclear.
III. THE FCC SHOULD USE THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" STANDARD FOR
JUSTIFYING ITS MEDIA OWNERSHIP RULES
This Part advocates for the "public interest" reading of section 202(h),
arguing that the FCC should apply this interpretation until and unless Con-
gress clarifies the provision. Section III.A discusses the precedent for the
public interest interpretation provided by recent cases in the D.C. Circuit
and the Third Circuit. Section III.B compares other substantive areas of ad-
ministrative law and draws analogies to show that a public interest
interpretation is more consistent with typical agency practice. Section III.C
looks to laws contemporary to the Telecom Act that focus on regulatory effi-
ciency and concludes that the public interest interpretation is more
consonant with the cost-benefit analysis those laws instituted than the ne-
cessity interpretation. Finally, Section III.D argues that several different
policy considerations call for a lower standard of proof.
A. Two Recent Judicial Decisions Provide Precedent for the
Public Interest Interpretation
In 2004, both periodic-review provisions of the Telecom Act came before
circuit courts. Cellco Partnership v. FCC'°6 addressed section 402(a) (section
11 of the Communications Act), and Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC'°7 ad-
dressed Section 202(h). Each court decided that the respective periodic-review
provisions called for a public interest interpretation rather than a necessity
interpretation. J0 They provide important precedent that should inform how the
FCC and future reviewing courts interpret section 202(h).
104. Id. at 163-65.
105. Id. at 170.
106. 357 F.3d 88, 90 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
107. 373 F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 2004).
108. See infra Sections III.A. I -II.A.2. These cases did not provide finality to the controversy
over section 202(h), because of the possibilities of differing, randomly selected appellate forums for
review of future quadrennial reviews and judicial deference to changing agency interpretations. See
supra Section I.B.
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1. Cellco Partnership
In Cellco, the D.C. Circuit resolved the conflict between the longstand-
ing public interest standard of the FCC's usual rulemaking authority, and the
proposed necessity interpretation of section 11 biennial review, in favor of
the former.'09 Verizon Wireless and Verizon Telephone challenged the FCC's
use of the public interest interpretation, and Verizon Wireless challenged the
FCC's decision to retain two telecommunications regulations." The Com-
mission used this interpretation despite section Il's two uses of the "no
longer necessary in the public interest" phrasing."' Judge Rogers, author of
the Sinclair majority opinion, wrote for a unanimous panel that deferred to
the FCC's legal interpretation." 2 The court distinguished Cellco from
Sinclair, because it took the standard of review of section 202(h) as given,
based on Fox i.113 Furthermore, the court held that "neither Fox I nor Sinclair
adopted a controlling definition of 'necessary,' much less the position that
§ 11 embodies a presumption in favor of deregulation."
'" 4
Cellco upheld the FCC's public interest interpretation to maintain con-
sistency between section 11 and the FCC's rulemaking authority. Although
Congress's delegation to the FCC for making rules regarding telecommuni-
cations uses the phrase "necessary in the public interest,' " 5 the court
explained that the FCC adopts rules according to a public interest standard
rather than a necessity standard.' 16 Criticizing the word "necessary" as
"chameleon-like, '""7 the court emphasized the need to interpret such a vague
word in its particular statutory context. Based on section I I's context, the
court agreed with the FCC that the words "necessary in the public interest"
mean the same thing in section 11 that they mean for the FCC's rulemaking
authority.""
Interpreting section 11 as a public interest standard, the court held,
"avoids absurd results where a rule is 'necessary' when adopted but not
109. Cellco, 357 F.3d at 90. For a discussion of section II of the Communications Act (en-
acted by section 402(a) of the Telecom Act), see supra Section II.A.2.
110. Cellco, 357 F.3d at 90.
11I. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 402(a), 47 U.S.C. § 161 (2000) (emphasis added)
(adding section 11 to the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.).
112. Cellco, 357 F.3d at 99 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984)).
113. Id.at98.
114. Id.
115. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2000) ("The Commission may pre-
scribe such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out the
provisions of this chapter.").
116. Cellco, 357 F.3d at 96 ("[T]he Commission can adopt rules upon finding that they ad-
vance a legitimate regulatory objective; it need not find that they are indispensable").
117. Id. at 96.




when it is subjected shortly thereafter to biennial review under § 11.""9 The
FCC would have to repeal any new media ownership rules that met a public
interest standard but fell short of a necessity standard within four years or
less-and could then pass them anew immediately afterwards. 2 0 Cellco's
holding does not necessarily apply to section 202(h), but since section 11
uses the word "necessary" once more than section 202(h) does, it has par-
ticular weight for having rejected the necessity interpretation.
2. Prometheus Radio Project
In Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals partially remanded and partially affirmed the FCC's 2002 biennial
review of its media ownership rules, affirming the FCC's use of the public
interest standard of review. '22 The FCC's report and order of June 2, 2003,
replaced the newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership rule and relaxed the na-
tional television ownership rule, among other actions.2 2 Both public interest
groups and regulated media companies appealed the FCC's order. Judge
Ambro, writing for the majority, rejected the regulated media companies'
argument that "§ 202(h) ... somehow provides rigid limits on the Commis-
sion's ability to regulate in the public interest."'' 24 As in Cellco, the
Prometheus majority saw section 202(h) and section 11 as closely related
and discussed the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Cellco approvingly.125
Prometheus provides arguments unique to the Section 202(h) context, in
addition to those in Cellco, that support the public interest interpretation.
The court analyzed the conflict in the text of Section 202(h)."' As the court
noted, "[flor the 'determine' instruction [in the first sentence] to be mean-
ingful, 'necessary' must embody the same 'plain public interest' standard
that Congress set out in the 'repeal or modify' instruction [of the second
sentence].' ' 27 The court rejected the necessity interpretation partly because
the word "necessary" does not appear in the second sentence.12 Further-more, the court explained (in an echo of Cellco) that a necessity standard
119. Id. at 98.
120. Courts would probably not overturn the FCC's actions in such a cycle for being arbitrary
or capricious, because, in this hypothetical situation, they would have been ordered by Congress and
the courts to perform both functions in the cycle.
121. 373 F.3d 372 (3d Cir. 2004).
122. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 382.
123. FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be codified at
47 C.F.R. pt. 73).
124. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 382.
125. See id. at 393 ("For the same reasons proffered by the Commission and endorsed by the
D.C. Circuit Court to reject the 'indispensable' definition of 'necessary' under § 11, we do so under
§ 202(h).").
126. See supra text accompanying note 50.
127. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 394.
128. See id. at 395 n.19 ("Textually it is not there.").
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would conflict with "the plain public interest standard that governs the
Commission's authority to regulate the broadcast industry."2 9 Prometheus
rejected such "incongruous results." 3°
The Third Circuit also rejected the whole-act-rule argument that the de-
regulatory emphasis of the Telecom Act calls for the necessity interpretation
of section 202(h), which requires the FCC to put a thumb on the scale
against its rules. As the Prometheus majority put it, "[W]e do not accept that
the 'repeal or modify in the public interest' instruction must therefore oper-
ate only as a one-way ratchet." 3 ' Partly this argument comes from the
neutral word "modify," which could refer to changes that strengthen,
weaken, or simply change the media ownership rules. According to the ma-
jority opinion, the deregulatory aspect of section 202(h) is the requirement
of periodic reviews by the FCC, not the standard of review.
3 2
The dissent and the FCC actually advocated an even lower standard of
review than the majority's public interest standard. Although the FCC ar-
gued for a public interest standard to justify any rules it wanted to keep, the
Commission wanted a standard requiring no evidence or justification at all
for any rule it wanted to repeal or modify: "'Section 202(h) appears to up-
end the traditional administrative law principle requiring an affirmative
justification for the modification or elimination of a rule.' " The dissent
agreed with the FCC's argument. 34 But the majority held that "[r]ather than
'upending' the reasoned analysis requirement... § 202(h) extends this re-
quirement to the Commission's decision to retain its existing regulations.' 33
This disparity appears to be the lone source of disagreement between the
majority and the dissent regarding the interpretation of section 202(h).136 The
dissent otherwise agreed that the interpretation of "necessary in the public
interest" means "useful" rather than "indispensable.' 3 That neither the ma-
jority, nor the dissent, nor the FCC advocated the necessity standard in
Prometheus provides a strong precedent for the public interest standard.
129. Id. at 394 n.17.
130. Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 119-120.
131. Prometheus, 373 F.3d at 394.
132. Id. at 395 ("What, then, makes § 202(h) 'deregulatory'? It is this: Section 202(h) requires
the Commission periodically to justify its existing regulations, an obligation it would not otherwise
have.").
133. Id. at 442 (Scirica, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (quoting FCC Broadcast
Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. at 46,286).
134. Id.
135. Id. at 395 (majority opinion) (citation & emphasis omitted) (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
136. Id. at 442 n.94 (Scirica, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). But see id. at 395 n.20
(majority opinion) (opining that the dissent's disagreement lies in the result, not in the standard of
review).
137. Id. at 445 (Scirica, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) ("While I would not term
this standard a 'deregulatory presumption,' the FCC is required to demonstrate that its rules remain
useful in the public interest." (emphasis added)).
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B. Comparisons to Periodic Review Provisions in Other Areas of
Administrative Law Support a Public Interest
Interpretation of Section 202(h)
Comparisons to other periodic reviews suggest that section 202(h) is
best understood as embodying a public interest standard of review. This sec-
tion looks to other congressionally mandated periodic reviews by
administrative agencies as interpretive guidance for the FCC or a court.
The analysis surveys the U.S. Code for provisions comparable to the origi-
nal, biennial form of section 202(h), not the amended, quadrennial form,' 39
to find comparisons that shed light on Congress's original intent in the Tele-
com Act and to provide a larger sample size. Provisions calling for "biennial
review" or "review every two years" typically encourage agencies to keep
their regulations up-to-date but allow the agencies flexibility. Comparative
analysis shows that periodic reviews do not typically function to change the
broad, substantive goals of the agency. 40 Rather, such reviews aim to main-
tain agencies' focus on their central congressional mandates.
Biennial reviews appear to be most often used by Congress to direct
agencies to review their own personnel or practices. For example, Congress
employed a biennial review system in 1998 to evaluate state transportation
improvement programs. Such programs "shall be reviewed and, on a finding
that the planning process through which the program was developed is con-
sistent with this section ... approved not less frequently than biennially by
138. This Note seeks to survey provisions that, like the original section 202(h), involve re-
views by agencies of agency policies on a biennial basis. But the provisions of the U.S. Code
discussed in this subsection are meant to be illustrative, not the results of a comprehensive survey
(or scientific sample). The specific search executed on Westlaw, searching the U.S. Code Annotated
database, was: "(review w/25 ((biennial OR biennially) OR (every w/10 'two years')))," which
resulted in fifty-six matches as of February 6, 2004. The search results included the Telecom Act
provisions discussed above and several provisions which did not constitute biennial reviews.
139. Congress appears to have made the change from biennial to quadrennial review for a
reason unrelated to the interpretation of section 202(h)'s standard of review: the FCC's reviews were
taking more than two years to complete. For example, the 1998 review was not completed until
2000. See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of
1996, 15 F.C.C.R. 11058 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n May 26, 2000). The 2002 review was not com-
pleted until 2003. See FCC Broadcast Ownership Rules, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,286 (Aug. 5, 2003) (to be
codified at 47 C.ER. pt. 73).
140. A survey of these provisions shows that none of them involve repealing a rule if it is
found unnecessary. See 7 U.S.C. § 1635j(b)(4)(A) (2000) (mandating biennial review of swine price
reporting information by the secretary of agriculture as part of the Livestock Mandatory Reporting
Act of 1999); 7 U.S.C. § 1964(d)(1) (2000) (requiring biennial review of emergency loan recipient's
ability to repay by the secretary of agriculture); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(p) (2000) (requiring the FDIC to
review its capital requirements); 22 U.S.C. § 2381(b) (2000) (allowing review at least every two
years of eligibility of government contractors involved in foreign assistance projects who have been
denied or suspended from receiving government funds); 29 U.S.C. § 208(a) (2000) (providing for
biennial review of minimum wage in American Samoa, to be conducted by the administrator of the
wage and hour division, whenever American Samoa's minimum wage is less than the federal mini-
mum wage specified in 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (2000)); 49 U.S.C. § 30141(e) (2000) (directing the
secretary of transportation to review every two years the amount of annual fee for importers of mo-
tor vehicles).
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the Secretary [of Transportation]."'' 4' To take another example, a river man-
agement program in 2000 included a biennial review provision for
management and protection of Florida's Wekiva River as part of the national
system of wild and scenic rivers. The Secretary of the Interior is instructed,,142
to report "any deviation from the plan. Another biennial review provision
directs the Secretary of Defense to review, not less frequently than bienni-
ally, whether the supply practices of its agencies are efficient and in keeping
with the Defense Department goal of "combat readiness."'
4 3
These three examples of biennial reviews, as well as other biennial re-
views that evaluate programs, '44 inform a reasonable understanding of
141. Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century, Pub. L. No. 105-178, § 1204(f), 112 Stat.
107, 184 (1998) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 135(f)(4) (2000) (repealed 2005)). For another biennial
review of state programs, see 42 U.S.C. § 10405 (Supp. HI 2003) (mandating a review "every 2
years" by the secretary of health and human services of state-run family violence prevention and
awareness programs).
142. Wekiva Wild and Scenic River Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-299, § 4(c), 114 Stat. 1049,
1053. For other biennial reviews of environmental and energy-efficiency programs, see 16 U.S.C.
§ 539e(b) (2000) (requiring the secretary of the interior to conduct a biennial environmental impact
assessment in Alaska's Tongass National Forest); 16 U.S.C. § 3334(a) (2000) (providing for a bien-
nial audit of state plans to reduce fishing fleet capacity, to be conducted by the secretary of the
interior); 20 U.S.C. § 7277c (Supp. IV 2004) (directing the secretary of education to conduct a
biennial review of a program to promote energy efficiency in school buildings and to report to Con-
gress); 30 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(8)(B) (2000) (requiring a biennial review and report to Congress by the
National Critical Materials Council on national mineral and materials needs); 33 U.S.C. § 1314(m)
(2000) (mandating biennial review by the administrator of the EPA of water pollution guidelines);
33 U.S.C. § 1345(d)(2)(C) (2000) (requiring the EPA administrator to review sewage sludge dis-
posal provisions at least every two years); and 33 U.S.C. § 2263(a) (2000) (requiring the secretary
of the army, in conjunction with officials from the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife
Service, the EPA, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to review biennially
conservation efforts by the Army Corps of Engineers with respect to conserving fish and wildlife
indigenous to the United States).
143. 10 U.S.C. § 192(c) (2000). For other defense- and security-related biennial reviews, see 7
U.S.C. § 8401 (Supp. IV 2004) (requiring the secretary of agriculture to publish, at least biennially,
a list of biological agents and toxins that pose a severe threat to animal or plant health); 10 U.S.C.
§ I 13(g)(2) (2000) (requiring the secretary of defense to provide to the chairman of the joint chiefs
of staff, at least biennially, policy guidance regarding "contingency plans"); 10 U.S.C. § 153(d)
(Supp. IV 2004) (requiring the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff to review national military strat-
egy every two years); 10 U.S.C. § 161(b) (2000) (mandating biennial review of combatant command
missions by the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff); 42 U.S.C. § 262a (Supp. HI 2003) (requiring
the secretary of health and human services to publish, at least biennially, a list of biological agents
that pose a severe threat to public health and safety); 42 U.S.C. § 1395u note (2000) (Improvements
in Administration of Laboratory Tests Benefit) (mandating a biennial review by the secretary of
health and human services of national policy on benefits for clinical diagnostic laboratory tests); and
49 U.S.C. § 44912(c)(4) (Supp. 11I 2003) (requiring the administrator of the federal aviation admini-
stration to review biennially the composition of the scientific advisory panel on technologies to
counteract terrorist threats to civil aviation).
144. For more examples of general program evaluations, see 8 U.S.C. § 1762 (Supp. II 2002)
(requiring the commissioner of immigration and naturalization to study biennially whether educa-
tional institutions authorized to accept immigrants as well as exchange sponsors have complied with
relevant regulations); 15 U.S.C. § 278k(c)(5) (2000) (stipulating that technology transfer centers
must submit to biennial reviews, with procedures developed by the National Institute of Standards
and Technology, as a condition of funding after their sixth year of existence); and 23 U.S.C. § 502
note (2000) (Transportation Technology Innovation and Demonstration Program § (b)(8)) (establish-
ing Recycled Materials Resource Center and mandating a biennial review of the center's program on
recycling in the context of transportation infrastructure by the Secretary of Transportation). A pair of
biennial reviews deal with education programs in specific. See 20 U.S.C. § 101 li (a)-(b) (2000)
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section 202(h). When delegating authority but specifying that a program
must be reviewed, Congress generally employs a standard of consistency
with agency goals rather than a stringent necessity standard. Additionally,
biennial reviews are most often used to monitor agencies and to provide
information about agency activities to Congress. Section 202(h) allows
Congress to monitor the FCC's effectiveness in achieving its statutory goals
of competition, diversity, and localism more actively than it could without
periodic review. Each review produces a public record (and, increasingly,
public debate 45) on a regular basis, giving Congress a chance to evaluate the
FCC's success. Admittedly, Congress may have intended to do something
completely different with section 202(h) than with other reviews by other
agencies. Yet understanding the periodic review device as a monitoring tool
for Congress provides important context for the FCC and the courts to re-
solve the ambiguity of section 202(h) and supports the public interest
interpretation.
C. A Public Interest Standard Allows the FCC to Conduct
Cost-Benefit Analysis
Contemporaneous with the Telecom Act, both Congress and the execu-
tive branch instituted additional requirements for federal agencies to assess
proposed policies using cost-benefit analysis. These initiatives suggest that
the FCC and courts should interpret section 202(h) from a cost-benefit per-
spective. Under this view the FCC should, every four years, determine
whether the benefits of its media ownership rules outweigh the costs.'46 Only
a public interest standard of review allows the FCC to execute cost-benefit
analysis in a practical manner.
(requiring institutions of higher education to institute biennial reviews of drug prevention programs
and to make the results available to the secretary of education); 20 U.S.C. § 5508(d) (2000) (man-
dating a biennial report to Congress by the National Environmental Education Advisory Council on
the state of environmental education). Finally, many other biennial review provisions deal with
finance, efficiency, and fairness in the way agencies run themselves. See 5 U.S.C. § 5347(c) (2000)
(mandating a biennial review of proportional representation on Federal Prevailing Rate Advisory
Committee by the director of the office of personnel management); 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(e) (2000)
(specifying biennial review by the NCUA board chairman of board members' areas of responsibil-
ity); 15 U.S.C. § 2227 (2000) (mandating biennial review of pre-fire plans for federal agency-owned
buildings or housing units); 31 U.S.C. § 902(a)(8) (2000) (including biennial review of "the fees,
royalties, rents, and other charges imposed by the agency for services and things of value it pro-
vides" in job description of federal agency chief financial officers); 31 U.S.C. § 7502(a)(3) (2000)
(requiring biennial review by the director of the office of management and budget of the dollar
amount of federal grants necessary to trigger an audit of non-federal entities); 37 U.S.C. § 303a(d)
(2000) (instructing the secretary of defense to conduct biennial review of "special" or incentive pay
for public health professionals in the armed services); 39 U.S.C. § 5402(k)(1) (Supp. IV 2004)
(directing the secretary of transportation to engage in a review of the need for an investigation-a
sort of meta-review---of "bush mail" carriage rates in Alaska).
145. See, e.g., Jube Shiver Jr. et al., FCC Ruling Puts Rivals on the Same Wavelength, L.A.
TIMES, June 9, 2003, § 1, at I (describing the building coalition of interests opposed to the FCC's
decision in its 2002 biennial review).
146. The FCC could attempt to include assessments in its cost-benefit analysis regarding the
fulfillment of its diversity and localism goals for media. But those goals are less easily quantified
than the FCC's competition goal.
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1. Initiatives of the 104th Congress and the Clinton Administration
Show the Predominance of Cost-Benefit Analysis at the Time
of the Telecom Act's Passage
Congress's commitment to cost-benefit analysis during the mid-1990s
should inform any reading of section 202(h). Those who advocate the neces-
sity standard often note the deregulatory zeal of the 104th Congress, both
generally and with respect to the Telecom Act in particular.4 7 That Congress
passed, in addition to the Telecom Act, the Contract with America Ad-
vancement Act of 1996.14' Along with its focus on social security, small
business, and the line-item veto, the Contract with America Advancement
Act also instituted section 801(b)(i) of Title V in the U.S. Code, a provision
that requires agencies to provide cost-benefit reports to Congress regarding
any agency rules.14 Robert Hahn and Cass Sunstein have characterized sec-
tion 202(h) and section 402(a) of the Telecom Act as examples of
Congress's increasing interest in cost-benefit analysis. 5°
In addition, the executive branch enacted the most important across-the-
board mandates for cost-benefit analysis. Section 801(b)(i) is definitely not
the first'' or only'52 directive requiring agencies to weigh costs and benefits.
President Clinton's National Performance Review was part of the adminis-
trative context in which the Telecom Act was drafted and signed into law.'53
Nearly contemporaneous with the activity of the 104th Congress was Vice
President Gore's initiative to streamline, or "reinvent," government.' 4 Re-
ducing costs and enhancing efficiency were among the key goals of this
initiative.' Together with section 801(b)(i), these cost-benefit requirements
147. The majority opinion in Fox I involves such an argument, noting "the mandate of
§ 202(h) might better be likened to Farragut's order at the battle of Mobile Bay ('Damn the torpe-
does! Full speed ahead.') than to the wait-and-see attitude of the Commission." Fox Television
Stations v. FCC (Fox 1), 280 F.3d 1027, 1044 (D.C. Cir.), modified on reh'g, 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir.
2002).
148. Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(i) (2000). The Contract with America Advancement Act also included
the Congressional Review Act, which allowed the Senate to pass a resolution of disapproval of the
FCC's June 2, 2003, order. S.J. Res. 17, 108th Cong. (2003); see also 5 U.S.C. § 802(c) (2000).
150. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1508-09 (2002).
151. See id. at 1489 & n.1 (noting that President Reagan's Executive Order Number 12,291, 3
C.F.R. 127 (1982), first required that agency regulations pass a cost-benefit test).
152. See id. at 1490 & n.3, 1507 (citing Executive Order Number 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638
(1994), and describing President Clinton's acceptance of the principles of cost-benefit analysis).
153. For example, around the time that the Telecom Act was drafted and debated, President
Clinton started an initiative to promote coordination on cost-benefit analysis across agencies. Jeffrey
S. Lubbers, The Regulatory Reform Recommendations of the National Performance Review, 6 RISK
153, 157 (1995).
154. VICE PRESIDENT ALBERT GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS -CREATING A GOVERN-
MENT THAT WORKS BETTER AND COSTS LESS: REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW
(1993), available at http://www.ibiblio.org/npr/nptoc.html (last visited May 27, 2007).
155. President Bill Clinton, Remarks Announcing the Initiative to Streamline Government
(Mar. 3, 1993), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nprlibrary/speeches/030393.html (last visited May 27,
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push agencies toward administrative efficiency, greater accountability to
Congress, and policy choices with demonstrable net benefits.1
5 6
2. Only a Public Interest Standard is Consistent with
Cost-Benefit Analysis
The public interest interpretation of section 202(h) allows the FCC to
engage in cost-benefit analysis. For the FCC to retain a rule, that rule must
have a positive net benefit in terms of at least one of the FCC's policy goals
of competition, diversity, and localism. Cost-benefit analysis suggests re-
moving any rules that do not have a net benefit. The cost of any rule
includes the opportunity cost of declining to adopt all alternative rules. With
its current workload and backlog,'51 the FCC does not have the resources to
examine absolutely every possible alternative to its rules. But as the result in
Prometheus demonstrates, the public interest interpretation does require the
FCC to compare its media ownership rules to some alternative policies. For
example, to retain a rule restricting radio companies from owning more than
eight stations in a market, the FCC must explain why the limit was eight,
not seven or nine.1
58
Conducting cost-benefit analysis of a rule is not, however, practically
compatible with the necessity interpretation of section 202(h). To justify its
rules according to a necessity standard, the FCC would have to do more than
show that a rule had a positive net benefit. It would also compare the out-
come in the relevant media market with the rule to the outcome in that
market without any rule at all. If the absence of regulation would not exces-
sively threaten the policy goals of competition, diversity, and localism, then
the rule would not be necessary." 9 The FCC would have to eliminate such
rules. Therefore, a rule could fail to be necessary, but still have a positive net
benefit. Removing rules that the FCC has shown to have positive net benefit
is contrary to cost-benefit analysis. This conflict between cost-benefit analy-
2007) ("Our goal is to make the entire Federal Government both less expensive and more efficient,
and to change the culture of our national bureaucracy away from complacency and entitlement
toward initiative and empowerment. We intend to redesign, to reinvent, to reinvigorate the entire
National Government.").
156. Cost-benefit analysis remains controversial for reflecting a utilitarian philosophical per-
spective and involving monetization of all personal values. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 190-220 (1993). But within its admittedly limited framework, cost-benefit
analysis can still be understood as flexible. In administrative law, it has been advocated as a way of
steering agencies away from seemingly absurd tradeoffs, which need not invoke a full embrace of
utilitarianism. See, e.g., W. Kip VISCUSi, FATAL TRADEOFFS 249-51, 263-65, 285 (1992), quoted in
BREYER ET AL., supra note 23, at 175-80. In practice, cost-benefit analysis is typically supposed to
be augmented with other considerations, especially in the Clinton administration's formulation. See
Hahn & Sunstein, supra note 150, at 1507.
157. See Charles Babington, Congress Nudges an FCC on Hold, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2007, at
DO 1.
158. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 432 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that the
FCC's order "lack[ed] a reasoned analysis for retaining these specific numerical limits" and remand-
ing the rule for more specific justification).
159. See supra text accompanying note 15.
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sis and the necessity interpretation provides additional support to the public
interest interpretation.
D. Important Policy Considerations Call for a Public Interest Standard
Beyond the comparative considerations of Section I1I.B and the cost-
benefit considerations of Section III.C, several policy arguments buttress the
public interest interpretation of section 202(h). This Section considers the
FCC's susceptibility to capture, its lack of responsiveness to the public,
congressional agency burrowing, and the one-way ratchet problem, and con-
cludes that the existence of these potential problems supports a public
interest standard.
1. Capture Concerns
The FCC has been particularly vulnerable to capture, and its quadrennial
review procedure should not presumptively benefit media companies that
enjoy superior access to regulators. Capture generally refers to the problem
of regulated entities having undue influence on agency regulators at the
general public's expense.' 6° One form of capture is straightforward. Regula-
tors sometimes provide disproportionate access to, or even associate socially
with, representatives of regulated corporations or other organizations seek-
ing to curry favor. This conflict of interest creates concerns about regulators
providing favorable decisions in return for job prospects16 or gifts.16 The
FCC also suffers, more subtly, from what is known as informational cap-
ture.163 In the radio industry, for instance, the agency relies on data collected
by a polling company (The Arbitron Company) and a consulting firm (BIA
Financial Networks), each of which relies on media firms for its revenue.'64The data companies' selection or omission of certain variables allows media
160. For a survey of various capture theories, see Steven P. Croley, Public Interested Regula-
tion, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 7, 7-25 (2000).
161. The "exit side" of the "revolving door" theory of agency capture states that "the lure of a
lucrative job in the regulated industry after tenure as a regulator ends will lead the regulator to sup-
port the industry." Jeffrey E. Cohen, The Dynamics of the "Revolving Door" on the FCC, 30 AM. J.
POL. Sci. 689, 690 (1986). One study found evidence that this effect existed, but only arose in a
regulator's last year of tenure at the FCC. Id. at 695. An earlier study tested the "entry" side of the
"revolving door" hypothesis. Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking: An Em-
pirical Investigation, 70 U. Cm. L. REV. 821, 834 n.52 (quoting William T. Gormley Jr., A Test of
the Revolving Door Hypothesis at the FCC, 23 AM. J. POL. Sci. 665, 681 (1979) ("[T]he appoint-
ment of a former employee of a regulated industry to a regulatory agency does increase the
likelihood of decisions favorable to the regulated industry.")).
162. For example, FCC Commissioners were treated to over 2,500 corporate-sponsored jun-
kets in just eight years. Bob Williams & Morgan Jindrich, On the Road Again--and Again: FCC
officials rack up $2.8 million travel tab with industries they regulate, May, 22, 2003,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=l 5 (last visited May 27, 2007).
163. See, e.g., Croley, supra note 161, at 834 (recounting the theory that agencies may be-
come unwittingly biased toward those they regulate because they rely so heavily on them for
information).
164. See DICOLA, supra note 5, at 16.
October 20071
Michigan Law Review
firms to shape regulators' perceptions of the industry and to avoid scrutiny
in certain areas.165
Courts and the FCC should interpret section 202(h) as instituting a pub-
lic interest standard to avoid exacerbating these problems. It is inappropriate
to hold the FCC, an agency subject to capture, to a standard with a deregula-
tory bias that benefits the media firms it regulates. Weekend junkets and
databases of industry information might already influence FCC regulators to
side with media companies-whether consciously or unconsciously, nefari-
ously or innocently. The additional deregulatory bias of the necessity
standard would push in precisely the direction that agency capture already
pushes-less regulation of business and less consideration of the public in-
terest.
2. Democratic Responsiveness
The public interest standard also allows the FCC more flexibility to re-
spond to public concerns about media ownership. In the time leading up to
the Telecom Act's passage, the components of the legislation relating to me-
dia fell outside of the public eye. News coverage of the Act often gave more
prominence to the issues of consumer choice in telephone service and long
distance rates than to broadcast regulation. But many members of the pub-
lic did become aware of the FCC's media ownership rules during the 2002
biennial review. Although individual members of the public overwhelm-
ingly opposed further deregulation, the FCC eliminated and relaxed
several media ownership rules in its June 2, 2003, order. 69 The FCC held
only one public hearing attended in person by all the commissioners.7
This lack of responsiveness suggests that using a public interest standard
in the FCC's quadrennial reviews is preferable. An agency with demonstra-
bly low responsiveness to public concerns lacks checks and balances-and
165. For example, the BIA database lacks any information about the percentage of airtime
that radio stations use for advertising. Software: MEDIA Access Pro 4.2 (BIA Financial Network,
Inc. 2005) (on file with author).
166. See, e.g., Lee Bergquist, For Many, Prices May Not Drop Much, MILWAUKEE J. SENTI-
NEL, Jan. 7, 1996, at 1; Lars-Erik Nelson, Op-Ed., Communications Bill Sends Mixed Signals,
DAILY NEWS (N.Y.), Feb. 5, 1996, at 25.
167. See, e.g., Eric Boehlert, Last Stop Before the Media Monopoly: FCC chairman Michael
Powell is likely to get media ownership deregulated-even though public comment is running 97
percent against it, SALON, May 23, 2003, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2003/05/23/
powells fight/index.html (last visited May 27, 2007).
168. Citizens filing comments in the FCC's 2002 biennial review opposed further relaxation
or elimination of media ownership rules ata rate of ninety-seven or ninety-nine percent. See Press
Release, Future of Music Coal., Citizens Urge FCC to Retain Current Media Ownership Rules (May
14, 2003), available at http://www.futureofmusic.org/images/PRFCCdocket.pdf.
169. 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review-Review of the Comm'n's Broad. Ownership Rules
and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecomms. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R.
13,620, at 13,622-24 (2003).
170. See Boehlert, supra note 167.
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is not democratic.17 1 If the FCC conducted its quadrennial reviews according
to a necessity standard, it would become less responsive to the public. Even
if a media ownership rule had positive effects about which the public com-
mented in a review proceeding, the FCC would have to eliminate that rule if
it could not meet the high burden of necessity. Using a public interest stan-
dard, on the other hand, allows the FCC more flexibility to retain or adopt
policies that the public perceives as beneficial but that the agency cannot
prove to be absolutely necessary.
3. Congressional Agency Burrowing
The FCC and the courts should not enforce deregulatory policy in the
absence of specific, unambiguous language to that effect, and the legisla-
tive reports do not reveal any such congressional intent. A necessity
interpretation would result in the transparency and legitimacy problems
associated with "congressional agency burrowing"-actions that embed
the policy preferences of outgoing, short-lived, or previous legislatures.
7 3
Many members of Congress, including the House leadership, favored
eliminating the FCC's media ownership rules entirely, but could not win a
majority for a bill that accomplished that result. ' 74 Having failed to elimi-
nate the FCC's media ownership rules outright in the Telecom Act,
deregulatory advocates in Congress might have intended section 202(h) as
a surreptitious way to achieve their desired end over time. 75 A necessity
standard, placing a high burden on the agency, might result in the eventual
elimination of all the rules. But interpreting section 202(h) with a deregu-
latory presumption is undesirable because it allows deregulation to operate
subtly, without public attention, and against what a majority of Congress
has been willing to support.
171. Cf CAss R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 325-26 (1997), quoted in
BREYER ET AL., supra note 23, at 174-75.
172. See supra Section 1.B.
173. This Section makes an analogy to Nina Mendelson's theory of agency burrowing by
outgoing presidential administrations. See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching
Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003). Admittedly,
the analogy to presidential agency burrowing is not perfect, because the legislative and executive
branches are such different institutions. But the similarity lies in the way that section 202(h), under a
necessity interpretation, would allow a policy without majority support at any time to stealthily
become law.
174. See supra Sections .B. 1, II.B.2.
175. One account based on insider recollections speculates that media companies and some
members of Congress had exactly this in mind with section 202(h):
Carefully crafted language in the bill mandated that the FCC "shall repeal or modify any regu-
lation it determines to be no longer in the public interest" every two years. [Preston] Padden,
[former News Corp. lobbyist Peggy] Binzel, and numerous GOP senators, some now sitting on
the Commerce Committee, guessed that the FCC wouldn't do the full justification exercise.
And that would be the launching pad for a court challenge. The little time bomb became part
of the total package and quietly began ticking.




The public interest interpretation is also preferable because a necessity
standard would exacerbate the norm against forcing media companies to
divest media outlets once the companies have purchased them. The FCC's
general reluctance to mandate divesture of radio or television stations means
that relaxing its media ownership rules functions as a one-way ratchet. Once
corporations purchase broadcast licenses, newspapers, and other media
properties, the FCC is unlikely to re-regulate and force widespread divesture
of television affiliates, radio stations, and newspapers. 76 As FCC Commis-
sioner Michael Copps has put it: "Suppose for a moment that [the
Commission] vote[s] to remove or significantly modify the ownership lim-
its. And suppose simply for the sake of argument that we make a mistake.
How do you put the genie back in the bottle?"'' 77 Practically speaking, in-
creasing or eliminating the limits on media ownership might be difficult to
reverse.
Because deregulation operates as a one-way ratchet, the ambiguous lan-
guage in section 202(h) should be read to create a public interest standard.
Asymmetry exists in the substantive policy because of the norm against di-
vestiture to which Commissioner Copps referred. The FCC can relax stricter
media regulations more easily than it can tighten looser media regulations.
The necessity standard would set up an unbalanced procedure, tending to-
ward the elimination of rules and exacerbating the asymmetrical quality of
media ownership regulation. The even-handed public interest standard
would avoid making the one-way ratchet problem more pronounced.
CONCLUSION
Section 202(h) requires the FCC to review its media ownership rules
every four years, but contains an ambiguous standard of review. The contro-
versy between the public interest interpretation and the necessity
interpretation will continue indefinitely because appeals from FCC proceed-
ings can end up in any circuit, courts might defer to the FCC if it reverses its
position regarding section 202(h), and Congress has yet to address the prob-
lem. The usual tools of statutory construction and legislative history cannot
resolve the tension between the necessity interpretation and the public inter-
est interpretation. The first two cases about section 202(h), Fox and Sinclair,
demonstrated the ambiguity of the provision but did not settle the question
of how to interpret it. Recent court decisions Prometheus and Cellco provide
176. Cecilia Rothenberger, Comment, The UHF Discount: Shortchanging The Public Interest,
53 Am. U. L. Rev. 689, 727 (2004) (noting "the Commission's traditional reluctance to force divesti-
ture").
177. Health of the Telecommunications Sector: A Perspective from the Commissioners of the
Federal Communications Commission Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Inter-
net of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 40 (2003) (statement of Michael J.
Copps, Comm'r, FCC), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
108_househearings&docid=f:86047.wais.pdf.
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important precedent but do not settle the issue, precisely because of the rea-
sons mentioned above.
Ideally, Congress would solve the problem by adopting the language
contained in the proposed Preservation of Localism, Program Diversity, and
Competition in Television Broadcast Service Act of 2003. t7 Until that reso-
lution occurs, the FCC and the courts should follow the reasoning outlined
in Prometheus and read section 202(h) as implementing a public interest
standard. This approach is consistent with the procedures and functions of
periodic reviews conducted by other agencies. It allows for cost-benefit
analysis without unnecessary burdens on the FCC research staff. A public
interest standard best addresses policy concerns about administrative effi-
ciency, capture, democratic responsiveness, congressional agency
burrowing, and the one-way ratchet of media deregulation. The FCC and the
courts should apply the public interest interpretation of section 202(h) to
allow the FCC flexibility to act in accordance with its longstanding congres-
sional directives of competition, diversity, and localism.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
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